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Abstract—The network market shows a hierarchy of providers,
with backbone providers and access providers. We aim in this
paper at describing the economic relationships between those
network providers, where content providers are associated to
backbone providers while access providers compete to attract end
users. We study those interactions thanks to game theory, using
a multi-level game model. We analyze in addition the vertically
integrated case, i.e., the situation when the backbone provider is
also an access provider.
We then discuss the impact of this analysis on the network
neutrality debate, highlighting the importance of a regulation on
prices charged by backbone to access providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet network is made of an inter-connection of
Internet service providers (ISPs) and displays a particular type
of topology. There are indeed two kinds of ISPs: transit ISPs
-also called Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs)- and local
ISPs, or simply ISPs in this paper. The latter provide the last-
mile link to end-users (the residential consumers). In contrast,
IBPs operate portions of the Internet backbone, whereby transit
services are offered to local ISPs. The local ISPs are charged
for the transit service and this service entitles local ISPs to
reach not only the IBP network, but also the IBP peers’
networks and any other network served by the latter [1]. On
the other hand, IBPs have no residential customers and serve
only content providers, though there are notable examples of
companies operating both transit and local networks.
The core economic distinction between the two ISP classes
is that local ISPs are thought to have more market power. This
market power is a result of substantial economy of scale in
providing mass-market (residential) broadband access, which
limits (today at least) the number of local ISPs in a specific
residential area. In particular, today’s the end-user choice for a
local ISP is limited to one to three at most. While (local) ISPs
compete for end users thanks to (in general quite long-term)
contracts, IBPs compete for transit traffic and for the access
of major content providers. This competition is known to be
fierce because individual content providers (i) generate a lot of
traffic and therefore can economically support dedicated links
from several suppliers, and (ii) can pick to locate themselves
at the points where the network access is the cheapest—that
is, to attach directly to the backbone [2]. Additionally, both
the easy supply of raw transmission capacity and the open
standard nature of the Internet keep the barrier to entry at
a negligible level [3]. We will see that, as a consequence,
the competition between IBPs can be modelled as a Bertrand
competition.
Our aim in this paper is to describe and analyze, thanks to
game theory, the economic relationships between the actors
in the Internet, with a particular focus on the impact of
the Internet network structure on the ISP competition. This
analysis will be helpful for regulatory bodies in particular
to better understand which are the parties suffering from
competition, and possibly leading to rules for a “better”
Internet. The paper can be viewed as an extension of [4],
where the economic transit agreements between ISPs have
been reviewed in order to determine their best strategy. The
network separation between IBPs and (local) ISPs was not
considered though, while it could be a key characteristic. As
in [4], end users ISP selection is performed thanks to a discrete
choice model.
Note that there are other papers analyzing the economic
interactions between ISPs. As an example, [5] uses a game-
theoretic model of two ISPs, drawn from a larger set consisting
of transit and local ISPs, who choose between peering and
transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of inter-
connection taking into account traffic imbalances. But it does
not consider like here an explicit model of the user behavior.
We will also model an alternative scenario where the backbone
service is provided by a unique IBP. This monopolistic sce-
nario has also received support in the literature. Actually, [6]
argues that the excess capacity which currently characterizes
the Internet makes IBP’s long-term profit expectation very
modest. Taking this into account and the fact that IBPs have to
bear substantial fixed costs, it concludes that some players will
unavoidably exit the backbone service market. If some players
leave, this will shift market power to the remaining networks.
Thus, a scenario where a monopolistic IBPs is operating is
also a feasible one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
model: it explains the separation of providers into IBPs and
(local) ISPs, their economic relations and profit functions,
as well as the users’ preference model determining the ISP
they will subscribe to. The decisions being played at different
time scales, the multiple stages will be described. We will
also explain why the IBP competition for content providers
and ISPs’ association leads to a Bertrand competition, so that
IBPs can be treated as a single backbone network. Section III
describes and analyzes the game at the shortest time scale: the
competition between ISPs for end users, making use of the
users’ preference model. It separates two cases: when there
is no transit price from the IBP (resuming to an analysis
carried out in [4]), and when there is a transit price t per
unit of volume. Section IV then looks at the transit price
determination which, even if made before the ISP competition,
is performed anticipating the subsequent equilibrium. Three
scenarios are considered: several IBPs in competition (hence
as a consequence of Bertrand competition, a transit price
t = 0), a monopolist IBP seeking to maximize his profit,
and a transit price chosen by a regulator to minimize social
welfare. Section V discusses a specific scenario where the IBP
happens to also be an ISP (a reality in some countries) and
investigates the consequences of that vertical integration on
the competition among ISPs. Finally Section VI concludes by
providing the trends that can be extracted from the analysis.
Mathematical proofs are provided in appendix.
II. MODEL
A. System Description
As described in the previous section, our aim is to un-
derstand the economic relations between ISPs (and their
competition for end users, while the competition for content
providers is addressed at a lesser degree), when there is a
hierarchy among those ISPs. Indeed, some are local ISPs (just
noted ISPs to simplify the notations), to which end-users are
directly connected, while other so-called Internet Backbone
Providers (IBPs) -also called transit ISPs-, represent providers
operating on the backbone network. Usually, IBPs intervene
only on the backbone, but the interesting situation when an
IBP is also a local ISP will be treated in Section V.
We therefore describe and model here the interactions of
all those providers in the context of end users choosing their
own ISP depending on price. The relations between end users,
ISPs, and IBPs are summarized in Figure 1.
A few remarks must be made at this point.
• Note first that CPs are usually connected to an IBP
(instead of an ISP) because of the amount of traffic they
generate and the possibility to dedicate a link to them [2].
• Moreover, it is well known that competition at the IBP
level is rather fierce [7]. In that market, CPs and ISPs sim-
ply choose to connect to the cheapest IBP (as opposed to
end-users who generally have additional considerations,
IBP(s)
ISP A ISP B No ISP
Set of end users
t t
pA pB
Figure 1. Representation of relations between users, ISPs and the backbone
network. Arrows are labeled with the unit prices (if any), with t per volume
and pA, pB per subscriber.
such as reputation or loyalty). When several IBPs are
present, because of this choice of the cheapest IBP by
ISPs and CPs, IBPs are engaged in a classical Bertrand
competition [8] leading at equilibrium to set a zero price
charged to ISPs and CPs. This is because, roughly, if
the smallest price of the opponent is positive, setting
your own price slightly less will attract all CPs and ISPs
(hence all profit), but this can then be done also by an
opponent, so the prices decrease to the marginal costs,
that we assume to be zero here. In game-theoretic terms,
such a situation is called a prisoner’s dilemma: all IBPs
would be better off in a situation with positive prices,
but selfishness leads to an outcome that is bad for all of
them. As a result, when several IBPs are present, the set
of IBPs will be treated as a (single) backbone network
with zero prices.
• Also, since we therefore consider a single IBP with CPs
connected to it, the relations between ISPs, the IBP, and
end users, are not affected by the price imposed to CPs;
we therefore can just consider them as part of the IBP.
Let us now define the economic relations between the actors
displayed on Figure 1. To simplify the analysis, we limit
ourselves to two ISPs, denoted by A and B. Those ISPs charge
subscription fees, respectively pA and pB , to the end users
attached to them. The IBP (possibly representing the set of
competing IBPs) charges a per-unit-of-volume price t to the
ISPs for the traffic they request, since traffic downloaded from
CPs to end users constitutes most of the Internet traffic. Note,
again, that we take t = 0 when several IBPs coexist.
Users are represented as a continuum of total mass assumed
to be 1 without loss of generality. We denote by σA and σB
the proportion of users with ISP A and ISP B, respectively.
Of course, σA, σB ≥ 0 and σA + σB ≤ 1. We also assume
that there is a proportionality factor d0 relating the amount
of traffic downloaded by users to the mass of users (in other
words, a mass σ of users has a total demand of traffic d0σ).
B. Multi-stage Decision Problem
We can remark that each stakeholder takes its decision
(price setting for ISPs and IBP, ISP choice for users) at a
specific and a different time scale. The decision taken at
a given time of course influences the later choices, but we
also assume that they are played strategically, that means
anticipating the actions at smaller time scales. Such interaction
problems correspond to leader-follower situations [9], where
the leader(s) -here, the actors playing at a large time scale-
anticipate the reaction of the follower(s) to make the best
strategic choice. For our specific situation, the decision order
of the multi-stage decision problem is the following:
1) At the highest time scale, the transit price t is deter-
mined. We will consider three scenarios:
• The case of several IBPs, then engaged in a Bertrand
competition for (local) ISPs, leading as explained
above to zero transit prices, and therefore to con-
sidering the set of IBPs as a single backbone at no
cost (t = 0 in Figure 1).
• The case of a monopolist IBP that can set the transit
price t to maximize its profit.
• The situation where the transit price t is determined
by a regulator seeking to maximize social welfare
(explicitly defined later).
2) Then the ISPs compete on the subscription prices.
3) Finally, each user chooses either one of the two ISPs to
get Internet access, or prefers not to get any access.
Multi-level decision problems can be solved by backward
induction, consisting in determining the followers’ reactions,
and using that knowledge to compute the leaders’ actions. We
will therefore successively analyze the behavior of the users,
the ISPs, and the IBP.
C. Users preferences
The model we consider to describe the users choice of
an ISP is directly taken from [4]. We summarize it in this
subsection: choices are taken based on the ISP subscription
prices, but also on other considerations (e.g., reputation)
that are sometimes difficult to rationalize. Basically, applying
traditional discrete choice models (see [4] for details), a user
is assumed to have a valuation (utility) for ISP i ∈ {A,B} of
the form Vi = α log(1/pi)+κi where κi is a random variable
following a Gumbel distribution and α log(1/pi) expresses the
dissatisfaction for large prices. The parameter α > 0 models
the user sensitivity to price, and the logarithm form comes
from studies on human perception of stimuli (here, price) [10].
Users choose the provider giving the largest valuation for
them, but there is also the possibility that they prefer not to
connect to any ISP, this being represented by the (random)
valuation V0 = α log(1/p0) + κ0 with κ0 still a Gumbel-
distributed random variable, and p0 > 0 being here the
perceived cost of not having access to the Internet. Under those
rules, the mass (or equivalently proportion) of users on each
ISP is (for i ∈ {A,B}):
σi =
p−αi
p−αA + p
−α
B + p
−α
0
. (1)
The limiting cases of one ISP setting a zero price lead to
σi = 1 and σj = 0 (i 6= j) if pi = 0 and pj > 0. When
both prices are null (pA = pB = 0), we moreover assume that
σA = σB = 1/2.
D. Providers’ utilities, user welfare, and social welfare
As a consequence of our model definition, the profits of
ISPs are
Ui = σi(pi − d0t) for i ∈ {A,B} (2)
and that of the IBP (indexed by I) is
UI = d0t(σA + σB), (3)
taking into account the subscription from end users to the ISPs,
but also the volume-based payment from the ISPs to the IBP.
Another value of interest is the user welfare UW, repre-
senting the total utility surplus that users get from the internet
access (compared to the situation with no access at all, i.e.
just the outside option). It is directly derived from the user
choice model of Section II-C, and has been proved from simple
computations in [4] to be
UW = log
(
1 +
(
p0
pA
)α
+
(
p0
pB
)α)
. (4)
Notice that the user welfare is equal to − log(1− σA − σB).
Hence the maximum is achieved when the mass of users
having an internet access, i.e. σA+ σB , is maximal, therefore
when one ISP offers the access for free (pA = 0 or pB = 0).
A last notion of interest is the social welfare SW. This is
the aggregated value (or utility) of all stakeholders: providers
plus end users. The utility of each provider is its profits,
while for the (aggregated) set of users it consists of the user
welfare. In order to deal with those non homogeneous values,
we introduce a factor λ expressing a unit of user utility in a
monetary unit. This factor also allows to weigh user welfare
against provider profits. As a result, social welfare SW is
SW = UA + UB + UI + λUWσApA + σBpB + λUW. (5)
III. ISPS PRICE COMPETITION
We now turn our attention to the second decision level
highlighted in Section II-B, that corresponds to ISPs playing
a game on subscription prices, given the transit price t, and
anticipating the reaction of users to their price profile (pA, pB).
Section III-A presents the case when t = 0, corresponding par-
ticularly to the case when there are several IBPs in (Bertrand)
competition. That case actually resumes exactly to the results
obtained in [4]. The mathematical contribution of our paper
starts in Section III-B (if we except the model definition with
hierarchical providers), corresponding to the case of a positive
transit price.
A. No transit price (t = 0)
The case when there is no transit price has already been
analyzed and proved in [4]:
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibria on the price competition
between ISPs depend on the sensitivity to prices parameter α:
• If α ≤ 1, the Nash equilibria are
– pA = pB = 0, which is not likely to be played since
setting a null access price is a weakly dominated
strategy for each ISP.
– pA = pB =∞, resulting in infinite profit for ISPs.
• If 1 < α < 2, the Nash equilibria are
– pA = pB = 0, which is not likely to be played since
setting a null access price is a weakly dominated
strategy for each ISP.
– pA = pB =
(
2− α
α− 1
)1/α
p0, which results in the
profits UA = UB =
α− 1
α
(
2− α
α− 1
)1/α
p0.
• If 2 ≤ α, the unique Nash equilibrium is pA = pB = 0,
hence ISPs get no profit.
B. With transit price (t > 0)
With a positive transit price, we are no longer able to derive,
in general, the analytical expression for the Nash equilibria.
However, we manage to provide the existence and some useful
characterizations.
Before that, let us give some properties of the best re-
sponse function, detailed in the following lemma, that will
be exploited. We denote by BRtA(pB) and BR
t
B(pA) the best
response of ISP A and B respectively, when the transit price
is t: it corresponds to the set of prices maximizing the profit
of the ISP given the action of the other ISP. In this scenario,
ISPs are fully symmetric (in terms of profit and set of actions),
hence we have BRtA(p) = BR
t
B(p) for every p > 0, and we
will omit the ISP subscript.
Lemma 1. Assume α > 1 and t > 0. The best response of
each ISP is (i)
1) single valued,
2) continuous,
3) uniformly upper- and lower-bounded by strictly positive
bounds, with in particular the lower-bound
α
α− 1
d0t <
BRt(p),
4) strictly increasing (in p),
5) strictly increasing with the transit price t: BRt(p) >
BRt
′
(p) if and only if t > t′.
The proof is given in Appendix A. We now enunciate the
main result of the section, regarding the Nash equilibria of the
game between ISPs. Similarly to Proposition 1, the equilibria
depend on the price sensitivity of users.
Proposition 2. Assume t > 0, then
• if 0 < α ≤ 1, then pA = pB = ∞ is the unique Nash
equilibrium, leading to infinite profits for ISPs;
• if 1 < α, there exists a Nash equilibrium, and every Nash
equilibrium is such that pA = pB
def
= pNE > 0, and
results in a strictly positive profit for each ISP, equal
to
α− 1
α
pNE − d0t. Moreover, if the Nash equilibrium is
unique, pNE strictly increases with the transit price.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Figure 2 shows on one example the symmetric best response
of ISPs. One can notice the properties given in Lemma 1:
the functions are increasing, and greater than αα−1d0t = 3,
with α = 1.5, d0 = 1, and t = 1. It also appears that the
Nash equilibrium is unique, which we have observed in all
the scenarios we analyzed numerically.
3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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3.5
4
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BRB(pA)
Figure 2. ISP’s (symmetric) best response functions, with t = 1.0, α = 1.5,
d0 = 1, and p0 = 1.0. There is a unique Nash equilibrium.
We can make several remarks when we compare the case
of positive transit price to the situation where it is null.
We first get some positive effects for ISPs, even though
they are charged that extra price: with positive prices, the
(weakly-dominated) Nash equilibrium (0, 0) does not stand
anymore, since attracting users by lowering one’s price yields
subscription revenues but also incurs costs due to transfer
charges. In the same vein, with a high sensitivity to prices
(α > 2), we are able to derive a non-null Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3 compares the Nash equilibrium prices in terms of α
when t = 0 and for various values of t, illustrating the results
of Propositions 1 and 2.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium prices of ISPs, as a function of α, for different values
of the transit price t.
We plot in Figure 4 the utility of each stakeholder for
α = 1.5, when the transit price varies. Both ISP and IBP
profits are first increasing, then decreasing, the maximum of
each one being reached for a strictly positive transit price.
It is interesting to note, and somewhat counter-intuitive, that
the sum of ISPs profits is first increasing (even if for a short
period) with the transit prices they have to pay to the IBP.
They can first compensate the payment by an increase in
their subscription fee, without decreasing too much demand.
Indeed, the transit price t prevents ISPs from decreasing their
prices too much, which reduces the extent of the “prisoner’s
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U
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Sum ISPs
User Welfare
Backbone
Figure 4. Utilities of the stakeholders at Nash equilibrium prices, as a
function of t, with α = 1.5, p0 = 1, d0 = 1.
dilemma” situation among ISPs: both ISPs stay with higher
price values, and improve their profit. Similarly, the IBP profit
first increases with t but then tends to decrease, because this
forces ISPs to increase their price, hence the total volume of
traffic decreases.
On the other hand, notice that ISPs do not benefit from
the transit price (in the situation plotted on the figure) if that
price is set by the IBP. Another negative effect of the transit
price is that user welfare always decreases with t, because
of the increasingness of the ISP equilibrium price proved in
Proposition 2.
Assuming that the Nash equilibrium is unique, we now
prove that transit pricing has to be prevented to maximize
social welfare.
Proposition 3. Assume that the Nash equilibrium is unique,
then the user welfare (4) at this point is decreasing with
the transit price t. Hence, for every price sensitivity α, it is
maximized for t = 0.
Proof: If α ≤ 1, the Nash equilibrium does not depend
on t. Hence the proposition is valid in this case.
If α > 1, from Proposition 2, the unique and symmetric
price at Nash equilibrium strictly increases with the transit
price t, while the user welfare (4) is a strictly decreasing
function of the ISPs price. Hence the result.
IV. IBP PRICE DETERMINATION
We now come to the first level of decision, where the
IBP price is chosen first but anticipating what would be the
Nash equilibrium at the ISP game level. As described in
Section II-B, we consider three scenarios: (i) at least two
IBPs engaged in a Bertrand competition and leading the transit
price to zero, (ii) a monopolist IBP setting the transit price
maximizing his profit, and (iii) a regulator determining the
transit price to maximize social welfare. From here, we use
a numerical solver, and draw the profits and utility of each
stakeholder at the transit price determined for each scenario.
All curves shown are for the parameter values p0 = 1 and
d0 = 1.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively show the utility of ISPs,
users, and IBP, as a function of the user sensitivity α,
comparing the above three scenarios for a fixed t (and with
the relative weight of UW versus provider revenues taken to
λ = 0.05). Maximizing social welfare seems to be a good
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Figure 5. (Sum of) profit of ISPs as a function of the user price sensitivity
α.
trade-off here, when α < 2, because its offers a balance
between user welfare and providers’ revenues (of course, that
balance depends on the value of λ). We observe that the
monopolistic scenario is better than the competitive one for
ISPs as soon as the user sensitivity is larger than a given
threshold. From Propositions 1 and 2, that threshold is always
below 2, since for α > 2, the ISPs profit is null when
t = 0. We observe that user price-sensitivity exacerbates the
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Figure 6. User welfare as a function of the user price sensitivity α.
competition at the ISP level, that becomes extremely fierce
when the transit price is null, as pointed out in Proposition 1.
As a consequence, for α > 2 subscription prices are null and
user welfare (and as a consequence social welfare) is therefore
infinite in the multiple-IBP scenario. On the other hand, user
welfare seems to grow linearly with α < 2 for the two other
scenarios. We can also remark on Figure 6 that competition is
better for users than maximizing social welfare, since the IBP
is not taken into account (see also Figure 7). Similarly, from
Figure 7, the IBP profit is larger for large users’ sensitivity
to prices (in the monopolistic case and up to α = 2 for the
social welfare maximizing case, since being zero for this last
situation for α ≥ 2), and is of course always zero when t = 0.
Figure 8 displays the transit price t maximizing social
welfare when α is fixed but the factor λ in the social welfare
varies (weighing user welfare with respect to provider profits).
We can see that this optimal price decreases: the user welfare
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Figure 7. IBP profit as a function of the user price sensitivity α.
is getting more and more importance, and this resumes to
decreasing t, up to a moment when t = 0.
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Figure 8. Transit price maximizing social welfare (5), with α = 1.5.
V. IF THE IBP IS ALSO AN ISP
In practice, it is often the case that a provider is at the same
time an IBP and an ISP (for example Deutsche Telekom in
Germany, or AT&T in the USA). We want to investigate that
scenario, by assuming that ISP A is itself the monopolist IBP,
and compare it with the case where the IBP is a different
provider (and chooses t to maximize his profit) as analyzed in
the previous section (that scenario being hereafter referred to
as the “differentiated case”). Under that new assumption, the
utility function of ISP B does not change, whereas that of A
becomes:
UA = σApA + σBt.
We assume that the decision order remains the same: ISPs set
their user price after the transit price t has been decided.
The results are displayed for the provider profits and user
welfare respectively in Figures 9 and 10, in terms of α.
It can be seen that whatever the value of α, ISP B loses
approximately the same amount because of the monopole of
A. A on the other hand wins more when α is small (small
sensitivity to price for end users). Surprisingly in Figure 10,
end users benefit from ISP A being also the IBP, this benefit
increasing with the sensitivity α. Actually, classical antitrust
analysis identifies this fact as one of the main benefits from a
vertical merger. Indeed, vertical mergers can avoid the double
marginalization that the presence of a upstream monopoly
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Figure 9. Profit of ISPs as a function of the user price sensitivity α.
and a downstream oligopoly may cause – see [11] for an
explanation.
1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
α
U
se
r
W
el
fa
re
Differentiated case
Merged case
Figure 10. User welfare as a function of the user price sensitivity α.
To better understand this evolution in terms of α, we also
display respectively in Figures 11, 12 and 13 the IBP optimal
price, ISP equilibrium price and mass of end users accessing
the network when the IBP is an ISP or not. Interestingly, the
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Figure 11. IBP optimal price as a function of the user price sensitivity α.
IBP reduces its transit price if it is also an ISP (Figure 11), and
the same happens for both ISPs’ price at equilibrium (but to a
lesser extent for ISP A). As a consequence, more users access
the network (Figure 13). This might actually explain the transit
price decrease by the IBP, that is now more sensitive (through
its ISP component) to the proportion of ISP subscribers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have built and analyzed an economic
model encompassing the main actors and aspects of the
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Figure 12. ISP equilibrium prices versus user price sensitivity α.
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Figure 13. Mass of subscribers for each ISP, as a function of the user price
sensitivity α.
current Internet market structure, including its hierarchical
nature, with backbone and local providers. Regarding the main
question addressed, concerning the economic relationships
between those types of providers in a competitive context, the
following conclusions can be drawn.
First, with users very sensitive to prices, then if ISPs are
not charged by backbone providers, the competition among
ISPs to attract subscribers is so fierce that it leads to null
profits for ISPs, and questions their survivability. Imposing
transit prices to ISPs to reach the backbone prevents that
non-desirable outcome, however the value of that transit price
must be properly determined: when appropriately set, it can
ensure the survivability of the network providers and a revenue
shared among local and backbone providers, while keeping
subscription prices to a reasonable level. In that context, the
structure of the backbone market is of prominent importance,
since even allowing backbone providers to fix the transit price
may lead to null transit prices because of competition. For
those reasons, it seems justified that the transit prices be
set by a regulator, and its value chosen to reach a globally
satisfying outcome (taking into account the user behavior, and
the competition among ISPs).
The situation when a backbone provider is also an ISP has
been considered, since it occurs in several countries. From a
global and user point of view, such a situation is economically
desirable since is drives user prices down, while yielding
the integrated entity a significantly larger revenue due to the
vertical merger, which can be used to maintain and improve
the network. We recognize here an argument of net neutrality
opponents, of the backbone provider having to charge the
traffic to ISPs (but not their own, here) to guarantee the
network sustainability. Nevertheless, the regulator intervention
may still be needed here, to ensure that the dominant position
of the merged actor does not prevent other ISPs from staying
in or entering the local access market.
That last aspect (regulation of a dominant position) is
beyond the scope of this paper, but can be considered in
a future work. Another interesting direction would be to
explicitly include the content provider side of the market in
our model. In particular, with regard to the net neutrality
debate, we would aim at investigating the justifications of a
differentiated pricing that would be applied by ISPs depending
on the content.
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APPENDIX
We show the result for ISP A, since it is symmetric for B.
Let us first differentiate the profit of ISP A with respect to
its set price pA:
∂UA
∂pA
=
(p−α
A
+ p−α
B
+ p−α
0
)p−α−1
A
(−α(pA − d0t) + pA)
(p−α
A
+ p−α
B
+ p−α
0
)2
+
αp−2α−1
A
(pA − d0t)
(p−α
A
+ p−α
B
+ p−α
0
)2
(6)
=
(
p−α
A
p−α
A
+ p−α
B
+ p−α
0
)2 (
−K(pB)p
α
A + L(pB , t)p
α−1
A + 1
)
(7)
with K(pB)
def
= (α − 1)(p−αB + p
−α
0 ) and L(pB , t) =
αd0t(p
−α
B +p
−α
0 ). Hence (7) has the same sign as the function
S(pA, pB , t)
def
= −K(pB)p
α
A + L(pB , t)p
α−1
A + 1.
Notice that, since α > 1, K and L are positive functions
(strictly for K).
(1) We have
∂S
∂pA
(pA, pB , t) = p
α−2
A (−αK(pB)pA + (α−
1)L(pB , t)), hence S(pA, pB , t) is strictly increasing with pA
until pA =
α−1
α
L(pB ,t)
K(pB)
> 0, and strictly decreasing after.
Moreover S is 1 when pA = 0 (since α > 1), and it goes
to −∞ when pA → ∞. Hence, by continuity of S, there
is a unique value p∗A (that depends on pB and t) such that
S(p∗A, pB , t) = 0, and S(pA, pB , t) > 0 (resp. S(pA, pB , t) <
0) if and only if pA < p
∗
A (resp. pA > p
∗
A). Consequently
BRt(pB) = p
∗
A is single-valued. Another consequence is that
we have a criterion to compare a price pA with the best
response BRt(pB):
pA < BR
t(pB) if and only if S(pA, pB , t) > 0. (8)
(2) The continuity is a consequence of Berge’s maximum
theorem [12]. The hypotheses of the theorem are valid here, so
that the best-response price application is upper hemicontinu-
ous. Since the best response is single-valued, it is a continuous
function.
(3) The best response BRt(p) is lower bounded by
α
α−1d0t > d0t. Indeed, for every p, S(
α
α−1d0t, p, t) = 1 > 0.
It is also upper bounded by x
def
= max(
1 + αd0t
α− 1
, p
α
α−1
0 ).
Indeed, S(x, p, t) = xα−1(p−α+p−α0 )(αd0t+(1−α)x)+1 ≤
−xα−1(p−α + p−α0 ) + 1 ≤ −x
α−1p−α0 + 1 ≤ 0.
(4) Let u and v be two prices for ISP B with u < v.
To show that the best response is strictly increasing with the
price, it is sufficient to show that S(BRt(v), u, t) < 0 thanks
to Relation (8):
S(BRt(v), u, t) = (BRt(v))α−1(u−α − v−α)
×
(
(1− α)BRt(v) + αd0t)
)
< 0,
where we have used the fact that S(BRt(v), v, t) = 0, and the
(previously proved) fact that BRt(v) > αα−1d0t.
(5) Finally, for every t+ > t− we have
S(BRt
+
(p), p, t−) = (t−−t+)αd0(BR
t+(p))α−1(p−α+p−α0 ) < 0,
hence the best response strictly increases with the transit price.
When α ≤ 1, p = ∞ is a strictly dominant strategy for
each ISP (i.e., the unique best response whatever the strategy
of the other ISP). This can be seen with the derivative of its
profit (7) being strictly positive.
We now consider the case α > 1. From Lemma 1, the best-
response function of each ISP i is continuous, and bounded
by strictly positive values. Let us denote by mi (resp. Mi)
the lower (resp. upper) bound of BRi. Then consider the
application
g : [mA,MA]× [mB ,MB ] 7→ [mA,MA]× [mB ,MB ]
(pA, pB) → (BRA(pB),BRB(pA)).
Since g is continuous and [mA,MA]×[mB ,MB ] is a compact
convex subset of R2, from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,
it has a fixed point that constitutes a Nash equilibrium with
strictly positive prices in [mA,MA]× [mB ,MB ].
From Lemma 1, the best response function, common to
both ISPs (BRA = BRB = BR), is single valued and strictly
increasing. Suppose that, at Nash equilibrium, pA 6= pB , for
instance pA < pB (should the indexes be permuted). Then
pB = BR(pA) < BR(pB) = pA, hence a contradiction. This
proves that every Nash equilibrium is symmetric.
Still from Lemma 1, prices at Nash equilibrium are strictly
positive, hence the first order necessary condition implies that
the derivative of an ISP profit is zero at such a point. From (6)
it follows that
2(pNE)−α + p−α0 =
α(pNE − d0t)(p
NE)−α
α(pNE − d0t)− pNE
.
Plugging this relation into the utility function Ui =
(pNE)−α(pNE − d0t)
2(pNE)−α + p−α0
leads to Ui =
α− 1
α
pNE − d0t. In
particular, since, by Lemma 1, pNE > αα−1d0t, then the profit
is strictly positive.
Assume that the Nash equilibrium is unique. We denote by
BRt the best-response of ISPs with transit price t. We also
denote by pt,NE the (symmetric) price set by ISPs at Nash
equilibrium. Then, for all z < pt,NE and every t > 0 we have
z < BRt(BRt(z)). (9)
Indeed, the best-response being lower bounded by a strictly
positive value, (9) is verified when z → 0. If there exists z <
pt,NE that does not satisfy the inequality, then by continuity of
the best-response functions, there exists pˆ < pt,NE for which
pˆ = BRt(BRt(pˆ)). But this means that (pˆ,BRt(pˆ)) is a Nash
equilibrium, which contradicts the hypothesis of pt,NE being
the unique Nash equilibrium.
Now, recall from Lemma 1 that the best-response is a strictly
increasing function of t. Furthermore, it is a strictly increasing
function of the other ISP’s price. Let 0 < r < t, and assume
that pt,NE < pr,NE (i.e., the equilibrium price is not increasing
with the transit price). Then we have:
pt,NE < BRr(BRr(pt,NE)) < BRr(BRt(pt,NE))
< BRt(BRt(pt,NE)) = pt,NE.
The first inequality comes from (9) together with the hypoth-
esis pt,NE < pr,NE. The second is due to BR· increasing with
the transit price, and BRr increasing with the price set by the
opponent ISP. The last one is due to the increasingness of
BR· in the transit price, and the last equality stems from pt,NE
being a symmetric Nash equilibrium price. Finally, this shows
a contradiction. Hence pt,NE increases with t.
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